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IDEAL TRIAL JUDGES
By P. W. LANIER SR.*
Judges may think that this article should be by a member of the
judiciary rather than a practicing attorney. To such, I do not agree.
It is only natural that one, when elevated to the bench, auto-
matically becomes a member of that select fraternity, the judiciary.
The movement from the arena to the bench, so to speak, is
calculated to change the new judge's psychological attitude as to
proceedings in the courtroom. It is this very happening that should
be to a major extent avoided.
The trial lawyer, uninfluenced by judicial fraternalism, is by
far better suited to speak on this subject because he is an advocate
acting for and against litigants before the court. This continuing
experience keeps him at all times alerted to problems of attorneys
and litigants, whereas the judge who does not have this close contact
with the facts, the law and the litigants involved in the case
being tried cannot in the beginning see the whys and wherefores
of happenings, and must acquaint himself with such as the trial
progresses. This sometimes requires patience and latitude of inquiry.
What is said here is not new to lawyers and judges generally.
We, however, as lawyers and judges alike, are interested in the
promotion of the general welfare, and movement should always
be toward the "ideal".
Knowing and seeing undesirable happenings are not necessarily
followed by corrections so as to avoid the repetition of such. This
is where action of the judge becomes necessary. He, in the, conduct
of the court, occupies a position from which he can get results
that will "speed the cause" toward the "ideal".
Occasionally, one might say, fortunately, rarely, one runs into
a trial judge who is utterly unfitted and not suited for the job,
temperamentally and otherwise. It is this type that tries the
patience and souls of all lawyers. In seeking to cover his inade-
quacies, like Tom who put in his thumb, he seeks to call attention
to his prowess by using the power of the court, which is great,
to show his authority. Just what to do with such a judge is any-
body's guess. I suppose one would not go wrong in just doing all
he could, not to be in contempt and in so doing endeavor to
make a record for appeal.
# Member of the North Dakota Bar.
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It is my considered opinion that the trend toward the ideal
trial judge is as great today as the trend toward procedure pro-
ductive of substantial justice. As a matter of fact, the two go hand
in hand.
The purpose of all lawsuits is substantial justice. The trial judge
is the hub of the wheel around which the spokes of evidence turn.
The purpose of the rules of evidence is an orderly and expeditious
trial. In the application of such rules the trial judge is supreme
until overruled by an appellate court.
The purpose of our jury system is to have the jury find what
the facts are under the guidance of the trial court's instructions.
The time was when highly technical objections to offers of
evidence, violative of a rule of evidence usually forced the trial
judge to sustain such objections under penalty of committing re-
versible error. The trend in recent years has been rapidly to -the
contrary. The ideal trial judge, unless prevented jurisdictionally or
by some mandatory statute, will not permit a technicality to
defeat justice.
The ideal trial judge seeks to have the witness give evidence
in a manner most understandable. To this end, the modern trend
is to direct the attention of the witness to the incident in litigation,
show that he was there and when and who was present, and then
be requested to tell what he saw and heard. Scientific tests have
indicated that the spontaneous narrative is more accurate and
uninfluenced by suggestion. Such narrative, when finished, should
be amplified by the question and answer method.
Just here the ideal judge not only has the right, but the duty
to interrogate the witness on such points deemed necessary for a
full disclosure. It is possible some question has not been asked
by the attorney for either side, due to fear of the effect of unknown
answers. The policy against leading questions by counsel has no
application in general to the judge whose office is to get the facts.
But, the judge should keep in mind the main object-substantial
justice-and when it is apparent that some fact for some reason
is not being brought out, he should not hesitate, by proper ques-
tions, to bring this fact to the attention of the jury no matter
which side it hurts or favors. The judge, experienced in presiding
over trials and in observing lawyers in the conduct of their cases,
may readily understand why some question has not been asked
by the attorneys, but the jury may want the answer to this very
question, and this answer might be determinative of the case
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in the interest of substantial justice. Such question should be
asked and answered. If not by counsel, then the court should
elicit the answer. The jury should not be left guessing.
Some judges, not the ideal type however, not due to corrupt
motive necessarily, are prone to do and say things in the conduct
of a trial, that indicate to the jury more confidence in the ability
of a lawyer on one side or the other. This is positively wrong,
and could well defeat substantial justice. The judge might be
correct or he might not be in his opinion of the qualification of the
respective attorneys, but in either event this should not be indi-
cated to the jury. The rights of the litigants should not be deter-
mined by relative qualifications of the attorneys, if it is possible to
avoid such.
The experienced, capable trial lawyer much prefers to have
as an antagonist one of like experience and capability than a
smart, young, inexperienced lawyer. The experienced lawyer in
such a situation is in the position of a first class fast ball pitcher
pitching to an inexperienced but husky batter. He hesitates to
bear down for fear he will hit the batter, give him his base and
perhaps hurt him. On the other hand, if he throws an easy over-
the-plate ball, the batter may land on it for a hit. In either event,
he labors under a handicap.
The trial judge is regularly confronted with cases in which
the young lawyer appears. They are coming out of law school
and beginning the practice every year. The problem is a present
one in our courts. The ideal trial judge recognizes this and can
do much to prevent happenings that will defeat substantial justice.
The need for ideal trial judges is great today in order to make the
machinery of progress function.
When a young, inexperienced attorney appears, a real problem
arises for both experienced counsel and the court. The inexperi-
enced attorney invariably will ask questions obviously subject to
objections that should be sustained. Such objections when repeat-
edly made and sustained could cause a jury to feel that the
young lawyer was being treated unfairly, or it might cause
the jury to feel that the young lawyer's case had no merit. Just
what the experienced trial lawyer or the ideal judge should do
in the interest of substantial justice is always a problem.
It has been my experience that it is dangerous to "show up"
the young lawyer, who, if he is smart, and he usually is, even
the inexperienced one, in argument can make much of his in-
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experience which is already apparent to the jury and thereby
get consideration for his client through sympathy far beyond
what the evidence warrants.
I have observed that the experienced trial lawyer has a sym-
pathetic and kindly feeling for the young lawyer; the same is true
of the court; they have all been through just such experiences
as the young lawyer is now going through. The ideal trial judge
under such circumstances should, when it becomes apparent
that such a situation is developing, call a recess to, chambers and
instruct the young lawyer on the points arising upon which it
obviously appears he needs such instructions. This is a practice
that is growing and it should. This is in the interest of substantial
justice.
I remember as a young attorney appearing in a case in a Louisi-
ana Parish, where the old Napoleonic code in a great measure
was in vogue. The case involved about $35,000 worth of crude
oil in tanks. My client was a friend of my family, and for this
reason I had been employed, and with the understanding, of
course, that I would associate an experienced lawyer in Louisiana
to try the case. It was my'business to line up the evidence. It was a
jury trial. I had the witnesses on hand on the day set for the
trial. There were four who came from distances ranging from
250 to 300 miles away. Associate counsel on the morning of the
day the trial was set was stricken with an acute attack of appendi-
citis and was in the hospital. This was the situation when the
case was called. The judge was kindly and understanding. He
readily announced he would continue the case if desired. But
he went further. He said opposing counsel was an outstanding
member of the bar and very fair; and that he would understand
I was not qualified under the Louisiana statutes and rules of pro-
cedure; but that with the approval of opposing counsel, he would
aid in seeing that my evidence went in properly. Opposing counsel
was agreeable to this. I was still fearful, but my client who so far
had been subjected to so much expense said, lets' go to trial, and
we did. The case went along smoothly. I won before the jury on
a close question of fact. This I might not have done, had I not
been a young, inexperienced lawyer. Perhaps substantial justice
was not done in this case. What should a judge do under such
circumstances?
I had an experience as an experienced lawyer while United States
District Attorney in a case in which an inexperienced lawyer ap-
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peared for a defendant which presented this problem. The lawyer
who appeared for the defendant is no longer inexperienced. But
in this case this problem was presented to both the court and
counsel. Judge Vogel, now of the Court of Appeals, was the
District Judge. The main problem was presented on the offer of
evidence of a character witness. The young lawyer was not familiar
with the methods of presenting such evidence which, as all ex-
perienced lawyers know, is simple and easy to follow. But this
inexperienced attorney in his zeal for his client undertook to go far
afield in his examination of a character witness. Finally, objection
was made and sustained. Questions were urged and counsel in-
sisted that he had the right under authority which he was ready
to show the court to present the evidence as he was seeking to
present it. The court courteously used every means at hand to
impart to the attorney_ the proper procedure. The attorney was
insistent and displayed law books which he claimed sustained
him; he was told flatly by the court that the law was settled on
this point and that he had no such right. The impression was de-
finitely created in the minds of the jury, I believe, that the young
lawyer was not getting a fair shake. There was a verdict against
the government, which I believe was one of the most perfect
cases for conviction that I ever tried.
In a case like this, what is the court and counsel going to do?
It's a tough nut to crack so as to give even handed justice to both
sides. To have let the young attorney wander all around in a
manner in which he was seeking to do would have been bad.
To not to do so, also. was bad as the results showed.
The ideal trial judge in the interest of orderly procedure will
require opposing attorneys to address their remarks to the court
and not each other. The courtroom during a trial is no place for
opposing attorneys to engage in across the table arguments. Any
thing said or done may be objected to, to the court, in the same
way that an offer of evidence may be objected to; unseemly scenes
will be avoided by strict enforcement of this rule. A judge who
becomes lax in the enforcement of such a rule can quickly lose
control of the trial. Such happenings are always regrettable and
contribute nothing to substantial justice.
When opposing attorneys or any attorney insists upon such tac-
tics, the ideal judge will not explode from the bench. But he
will call the attorneys to chambers outside the presence of the
jury and firmly state what he wants done or not done. A failure
1958]
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on the part of the attorneys or attorney to observe such admoni-
tion should result, in the presence of the jury, to such action on
the part of the trial judge as he at the time deems fitting. Any
attorney who now violates such rule does so under the penalty
of being, in the presence of the jury, dealt with as the court
deems. proper.
The ideal trial judge is slow to interfere with attorneys in their
arguments to a jury. But when an attorney is obviously, and
obviously intentionally, going outside the record to bring into his
argument facts that are calculated to influence the jury on some
material issue that are not in the record in fact or by inference
from the facts, will, without objection from opposing counsel,
stop such argument and accompany such action with an admoni-
tion to the jury to the effect that such argument has no foundation
in fact and should not be considered by them.
Of course, if no objection is made and the trial judge does not
act, the general rule is that such argument is not reversible error.
But when an attorney has deliberately overstepped the evidence
in this way, opposing counsel should not be required to object.
To do so might prejudice the jury against his client. The ideal
judge will act without objection.
The ideal trial judge gives careful consideration to requested
instructions. The attorneys have naturally devoted more time
and thought to the case than the judge. What the judge says
carries great weight, and it should. This makes it important that
the judge's instructions should as fully and fairly give the appli-
cable law as possible. While a refusal to give some requests, even
though sound law, may not be reversible error, yet some such
requests may more fully and fairly give the law than as given under
the stereotype instructions of the court, which generally cover the
points sought to be covered by the special request. The ideal trial
judge in recognition of the fact, if such be the case, in the interest of
substantial justice, will give such requests. This does not mean
that such requests should be given, so to speak, upon the slightest
provocation. Some lawyers are prone to have a way of just spout-
ing requests to give the court, and should in the interest of
substantial justice, be turned down. Too much law sometimes, like
too many cooks, spoils the broth.
The ideal trial judge when requests are refused, realizes that
unless exception to such refusals are taken, such rejections are
rot assignable as error. When the jury has been instructed, the
[VOL. 34
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court retires to chambers for the purpose of letting the attorneys
take exceptions to the insructions as given and the rejections.
Of course, exceptions to instructions as given should be specific
and point out just what is excepted to. Under the rules specifications
as to rejections are also required, both Federal and State. But
the reasons for such specifications is not so real. And the trend is
toward dispensing with such reasons unless the court calls for
such. The ideal trial judge, should he want a specification, should
so indicate. Or, in case he does not, should indicate such to be the
case. All of this to avoid unnecessary encumbrance of the record in
chambers with specifications of reasons, and on appeal with points
or assignments of error as to alleged infractions.
The ideal trial judge indulges the presumption that no lawyer'
is seeking special privileges from the court until that presumption
has been overcome by words or conduct indicating the contrary.
If and when this comes to pass, he will treat with such attorney
at a distance that will protect the court from unseemly happenings.
Nothing is more conducive to respect for the administration of law,
than confidence in and respect for the trial judge. He is the one
the people see and know, not the appellate judges. On the other
hand, lack of confidence in and respect for the trial judge, creates
a fearful undermining of respect for the administration of law.
Now, I am about to say something that may create contro-
versy among lawyers. But what I say is based upon contact with
judges in all courts, from the Justice of the Peace to the Justices
of the United States Supreme Court.
It is my considered opinion that judges as a rule are prone to
drift into a life of seclusion; into a fraternity of themselves. In
other words, they get in the habit of maintaining an association
with the public and lawyers that has to do mainly with contacts
in court and in chambers. When court adjourns, it is home or
to the privacy of the hotel room they go. The general public likes
to meet and talk with the judges. To my way of thinking such
contacts are helpful to the administration of law. It keeps the
judge in touch with the public and what's going on and the
general talk that goes on and it keeps the public in touch with
a person upon whom they are inclined to look with some degree
of awe. He is somebody we read about, we hear about, but for
some reason we don't meet as we do other people.
The ideal trial judge, to my way of thinking, is one who so
conducts himself in the court room that his presence anywhere
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among decent people! gives no cause for criticism, but on the
other hand, adds to his stature as a member of the judiciary,
and the above board practice is calculated to stop wonderment
as to what the judges do when they are not on the bench.
After all, the judge is nothing but a lawyer. Before he went on
the bench he did what other lawyers did. His likes and dislikes
were the same as other members of the bar. To change one
overnight and make a recluse out of him is hard on the judge
and not good for the people
The ideal trial judge, as a rule, is just a good, average lawyer,
who knows the problems of lawyers and who knows lawyers;
who has worried with clients over their problems; who has en-
joyed associations with people in all walks of life; who is familiar
with small as well as major problems common to the people, and
who, when he goes on the bench, does not become a recluse; and
this goes for all judges.
In the legal profession specialization is necessary more than
ever before. Industry is bigger than ever before. Incomes are
big and growing bigger, tax problems are acute and growing
more difficult and intricate every year. The peoples of the world
are getting closer and closer to each other. International problems
are many and greater, and the need for international lawyers
is commensurately great.
Close in importance to the use by lawyers of expert witnesses
is the necessity for trial judges under the rules of evidence in
the exercise of judicial discretion to pass upon the qualifications
of and necessity for an expert.
Of course, it is elementary that evidence to be admissible as
opinion evidence from an expert must be as to something that
the jury can be made to better understand. If the jury is as capable
of forming an opinion on the evidence as the expert, such testimony
is inadmissible. But in this era of technology and scientific pro-
gress, there is much on which the average man needs enlightening.
The ideal judge in the interest of substantial justice will lean
toward latitude in passing on such offers of evidence.
But with it all we have our jury system intact, which is our
guarantee against the loss of freedom so long as our courts are
presided over by the right kind of trial judges backed up by the
right kind of appellate courts.
With all of this specialization in the legal profession, the need
for the trial lawyer has not lessened, but grown greater. Some
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think this not true. Nothing has happened in the midst of all
this growth and expansion in this era of progress to prevent the
real trial lawyer with the use of the experts that are available in
all lines of endeavor from effectively functioning in the trial of
jury cases. And to guarantee the continuation of our great breast-
work of protection, the jury system, the trial judge as the "keeper
of order" is essential.
One judge I would like to mention as an ideal judge. Judge
John Caskie Colleti of the Eighth Circuit who departed this life
on December 5, 1955. It so happens that I met him in North
Dakota at a time when he was serving under assignment of the
presiding judge of the Eighth Circuit in the capacity of a Dis-
trict Judge in the State of North Dakota. Well do I remember
when I first met Judge Collet, in the early 1940's at Minot, North
Dakota. I was the United States Attorney in charge of the prose-
cution of some four conspiracy cases-conspiracies to violate
the Frazier-Lemke Bankruptcy Act under which the conciliators in
connection with unlawful organized solicitation of farmers for bank-
ruptcy were charged with misrepresentation and fraud in obtain-
ing and filing petitions in bankruptcy. Due to a misunderstanding
of the law and purposes of that act, at that time there had grown
up in North Dakota a very definite resentment against the United
States Government on account of these prosecutions. When Judge.
Collet, under assignment of the presiding judge of the Eighth Circuit,
came to North Dakota, he came with full knowledge of this situa-
tion. The first case was tried at Minot, North Dakota. And well
do I remember when the case was tried. It was begun in a
crowded court room in which the atmosphere was charged with
resentment toward the United States Government, as I said, due
to a misunderstanding of the facts, the law and the purposes of
the act.
I remember well at the outset of this case, Judge Collet's exam-
ination of jurors on their voir dire and how in the course of such
examination, veritably speaking, in just a few minutes the tension
was eased; I felt much better; the rumbling ceased. You could
feel it. The dignity of the court and the majesty of the law
reigned supreme in that crowded court room. The: court's examina-
tion of the jurors emphasized the even handling of justice, and
he did it again and again in his peculiarly adroit but unmistakable
manner, and when this examination was finished, it was plain to
1. Deceased.
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be seen that the effects of an organized program of propaganda,
intended to create the impression that these cases were persecutions,
had been wiped out. There were convictions. Nothing unseemly
happened inside or outside the court room. The court then moved
to Bismarck where three other cases of like nature were tried with
like results. This was an amazing accomplishment with the state
of feeling as it had been before Judge Collet's arrival. Fairness,
firmness and proper diplomacy had sustained the dignity of the
court and the majesty of the law.
It so happened that I was honored by being made a member
of the committee appointed by the United States Circuit Court
for the preparation and presentation of appropriate resolutions at
the Memorial exercise held on the 7th day of March, 1956, at
St. Louis, Missouri.
During this memorial occasion, Judge Stone of the Eighth Cir-
cuit, referring to the visit of Judge Collet, to which I have just
called attention had this to say:
"During the latter years of the last war, there developed, in
North Dakota, a situation involving the enforcement of the Frazier-
Lemke Act which resulted in a number of federal indictments of
farmers and others. This aroused bitter resentment which was
speedily fanned into what became really an incipient insurrection.
This grew quite menacing. The local District Judge, very properly
disqualified himself and it became my duty to assign an outside
judge to try these sensitive cases. After fully explaining the situa-
tion to Judge Collet, I asked him to accept the assignment. With
no slightest pause, he took this ugly mess, where a less courageous
man might have hesitated.
"After he returned from trial of all of these cases-some result-
ing in convictions and some acquittals-I received three letters.
One was from the Local District Judge (now an honored judge
of this Court), and one from Mr. Lanier, the United States Attor-
ney who prosecuted the cases, and one from the principal attorney
for the defendants. Each letter praised Judge Collet in highest
terms and I want to read you a quotation from the letter I
received from Mr. Francis Murphy, who was the main counsel for
the defendants, and who was looked to by the people who were
so much aroused to look after what they thought were the public
interests. This was from Mr. Murphy's letter:
'I have just completed trial of a number of cases before
Judge Collet assigned to this District. I know that I express
[VOL. 34
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the opinion of all of the members of the bar who have had
the privilege of appearing in a court presided over by Judge
Collet when I say that his appearance here is very greatly
appreciated. We of this State learned from him something
about the proper method of administering justice and con-
ducting the trial of cases. I sincerely hope that he will be
assigned to this District again in the future.' "
The trial judge in his associations, contacts and duties is so
encompassed about with requirements to make sudden off-the-cuff
decisions, that he is more likely to err than an appellate court. The
appellate judges do not have to make such sudden decisions. The
trial judge for this reason is more likely to err than appellate
judges. While the trial judge desires, as he should, not to err,
the ideal trial judge will think more of what substantial justice
is than how it will affect his record as' a judge. If he errs on a
close question toward the side of substantial justice, the appellate
court, with due deliberation, if the error warrants, may so find
and take responsibility, after due consideration, for the contrary
opinion.
The trial judge, in other words, blazes the trail through the
forest of allegations and counter-allegations, charges and counter-
charges and conflicting evidence to finally reach the destination,
a jury verdict. The appellate judges examine this trail to see if
there have been detours, and if so, were such detours prejudically
erroneous to the extent of requiring a modification or reversal
of the lower court's action.
There is no doubt that lawyers oftentimes in trial of cases blow
their tops in a way that moves the judge to blow his. This is
where the ideal judge shows his stuff. I am using, just here, some
crude language, but such occurrences can be best be described by
the use of such language. Firm, level-headed reprimands are the
order of the day, to be followed, if necessary, with disciplinary
action. The day is past when such exhibitions are permitted. The
time was in many jurisdictions when lawyers felt that they were
not earning their money without a personal altercation with
opposing counsel.
It was told on Bob Taylor some 50 odd years ago, later a
governor of Tennessee, that when he was a young and physically
fit lawyer, he was employed to represent a mountaineer client
in the mountains of east Tennessee in a Justice of the Peace Court.
The lawyer on the other side, an experienced member of the
1958]
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bar, found that young Bob was opposing him and called him
to his office. There he said, in substance: "Young man, let's save
some expense by hiring jointly a livery rig and going together
to the mountain top". To this young Bob was agreeable. Driving
up the mountain the old lawyer said, in substance: "What our
clients want is action; so when we get going in the trial I'll lay down
a principle of law and you doubt it, and I'll call you a liar and
we will have a friendly fight". Young Bob did not see where he
would suffer and agreed. The time came, the lie was passed, and
the fight was about to begin, when young Bob's client threw
him aside with the words, "I hired you to do my legal fighting,
get out of the way". The client then proceeded to beat the h
out of the older lawyer.
Progress, fortunately, has made obsolete such methods. Decorum
and courtesy have taken the place of technicalities and prearranged
dramatics.
I recall now a District Judge of this state whom I first met
in the fall of 1923; that was the year I arrived in North Dakota.
This judge has passed on to his reward, and I know he has it
coming. Substantial justice was his motto. He had been County
Judge of Wells County, North Dakota, when 'a vacancy occurred
on the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District and he was
appointed. My first case in North Dakota was before this judge
at his first term of court in the Fourth Judicial District at Carring-
ton, North Dakota. Judge Fred Jansonius 2 was the judge. I was
representing some guarantors on a note to the Juanita State Bank,
then under receivership. I had come from Tennessee, a quasi-
common law state; my knowledge of North Dakota statutes was
limited; I might say to the statutes involved in the case on trial
and to a certain extent as to these statutes. The case got under way.
Opposing counsel was George Thorpe3 and Pat Kelly 4; then of
Minneapolis, formerly of Carrington, North Dakota, an able and
finished trial lawyer; and Thorpe, who at the time was a leading
trial lawyer of this state. The case had not gone far until I de-
cided that if these lawyers were fair specimens of the North
Dakota Bar I would have tough opposition in my new field of
endeavor.
I think I can make the point I want to make without going
into details. My newness in the state was known to Judge Jan-
2. Deceased.
3. Deceased.
4. Deceased.
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sonius as were the capabilities of opposing counsel. It was a
jury case. Many of the jurors were known to opposing counsel,
if not in person, by reputation; and unknown to me. In the course
of this trial, several times the judge as unostensibly as possible
came to my assistance on procedure and statutory questions. When
the proof was all in, the case was settled and never went to jury.
Here was a judge who had recognized back in 1924 that the
real purpose of a trial was substantial justice.
An example of judicial consideration and calculated courtesy
came out of the Supreme Court of this state in my first appear-
ance before that tribunal, I believe in 1924.
The court, as I recall, then consisted of Christianson', Nuessle,
Birdzell, Bronson 6 and Robinson.' I believe Christianson was Chief
justice. Having been brought up under quasi-common law plead-
ing and being new to the statutory pleading of this state I was
impelled from habit to use to a great extent common law verbiage
and form. My complaint, to say the least, was rather unusual in a
statutory state.
In the course of the argument, to this court, opposing counsel
took occasion to refer to my pleadings as being antiquated and
verbose. I was naturally embarrassed. I knew this was true insofar
as this state was concerned, with its progressive, statutory pleading.
The court could see this. Knowing that I had just shortly been
admitted to the North Dakota Bar, Judge Christianson had this
comment to make from the bench, "A complaint in this kind of
case in this state, if good under the common law, is abundantly
good here." I think this statement on the part of Judge Christianson
is practically verbatim. It lifted me from the slough of Despond.
One might think from what I have said that strict decorum in
the court room bars the use of repartee that is provocative of
mirth. This is not so. There are times when a lawyer lays himself
open to such, yes, even to the extent of its being the best for all
parties concerned.
I recall a case in which I had no part as an attorney. On oppos-
ing sides were Judge W. S. Lauder8 of Wahpeton and Russell D.
Chase9 of Jamestown. It was a jury trial. The courtroom was crowded
at Jamestown. Judge J. A. Coffey10 was presiding. An offer of evi-
5. Deceased.
6. Deceased.
7. Deceased.
8. Deceased.
9. Deceased.
10. Deceased.
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dence was made by Chase and objected to by Lauder. In support of
his objection, Judge Lauder, a rough and tumble trial lawyer, vehem-
ently, in language that, would not be permitted by the courts of
today, excoriated Chase for making such an offer. Without going
into the merits of the objection, I think I can make my point by
giving what Chase did and said. To begin with, Chase was a
natural humorist. He was about 6' 1" tall, a fine specimen of phy-
sical manhood, big brown eyes and handsome. He stood up behind
his table, looked the court room over, the jury and then the court.
I thought he was about to, give Lauder h .... He did nothing of
the kind. He simply said: "For pity sake", and sat down. The court
room roared, the jury joined in, and the court smiled and said,
"let's proceed". There was nothing the ideal judge could do in such
a situation as had developed, except what he did do. So we can
see, the court room after all is not a dull, uneventful place. In fact,
it is a stage at all times set for unexpected happenings.
Finally, and most important in North Dakota under the Fed-
eral and State Rules of Civil Procedure, the ideal trial judge with
less expense, less delay and less confusion can make an end to
litigation.
Long, drawn out litigation, and prolonged arguments of counsel
in the presence of the jury, often times over many matters that can
be disposed of quickly in pretrial conferences, would, not only
"speed the cause", but would also make a record more intelli-
gible to a jury, all of which would contribute greatly to substantial
justice.
"Speeded" action on all interlocutory matters, motions for judg-
ments non obstante veredicto, and new trials, certifications of
records on appeal and such matters, would move a case without
delay to an appellate court. Then, if the appellate court without
delay hears and determines such appeals, the good work of the
trial .courts are not without avail.
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